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Judicial Review of the EEOC's Duty To
Conciliate
Stephanie Greene* & Christine Neylon O'Brien**
ABSTRACT
More than 50 years after the enactment of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, federal courts remain unsettled on a variety of issues
involving the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC")
pre-suit obligations. Title VII gives the EEOC the authority to enforce
the statute's prohibition on discrimination in the workplace. Before
filing suit against an employer, the EEOC must satisfy several pre-suit
requirements, including an attempt to eliminate the unlawful practice "by
informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." Courts
disagree on the following: (1) whether the EEOC's conciliation efforts
are subject to judicial review; (2) what the standard of judicial review
should be; (3) what the remedy should be if a court finds the EEOC
failed to fulfill its pre-suit obligations; and (4) whether the EEOC may
bring suit on behalf of unidentified individuals under § 706 of Title VII.
In EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit was the first circuit court of appeals to find that conciliation
efforts are a matter of agency discretion and are not subject to judicial
review. Other courts have reviewed the conciliation process and have
required that the EEOC demonstrate at least good faith efforts to
conciliate. The U.S. Supreme Court granted Mach Mining's petition for
certiorari, and rendered its decision on April 29, 2015, as this article
went to press.
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The Court did not specifically adopt the approach recommended by
any of the lower courts. Although it disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's
conclusion that conciliation efforts are not reviewable, the Court's
decision and reasoning were more consistent with arguments made by
the Seventh Circuit than by other circuit courts of appeal. The Supreme
Court found that Title VII calls for a "relatively barebones review" of the
EEOC's efforts. To satisfy its pre-suit obligations, the Court stated, the
EEOC must inform the employer of the specific allegation and identify
which individuals or class of employees suffered from the alleged
discrimination. The Commission must then engage in discussion with
the employer to attempt to resolve the problem. The EEOC must present
some evidence verifying its efforts to conciliate and a court may review
an employer's contention that conciliation did not occur. A court's
review of the conciliation efforts is limited to fact-finding on those
issues, the Supreme Court stated. The Supreme Court's decision largely
echoes the Seventh Circuit's concern that courts recognize the broad
discretion that Title VII gives to the EEOC in resolving disputes, the
importance of Title VII's confidentiality provision, and Title VII's
overarching goal of eradicating discrimination in the workplace. The
Court stated that the remedy for failure to conciliate is more conciliation
and not dismissal on the merits.
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INTRODUCTION
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC" or
"Commission") is charged with administering Title VII, which prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. If the EEOC finds reasonable cause to sue an employer
for an unlawful discriminatory practice, the statute requires that it
"endeavor to eliminate the alleged unlawful employment practice by
informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."' The
EEOC and employers are currently locked in battle over how much effort
the EEOC must exert to resolve a case before filing a discrimination suit
under Title VII. Some employers and commentators suggest that the
EEOC, motivated by the publicity of high-profile discrimination suits,
has been overly aggressive in its litigation strategy.2 The EEOC should,
they argue, be more diligent in its efforts to resolve charges of
discrimination through voluntary conciliation. Moreover, to ensure that
the EEOC gives employers an adequate opportunity to conciliate, courts
should review the EEOC's efforts to determine whether the conciliation
was conducted in good faith. Employers have even argued, with some
success, that if the EEOC fails to conciliate in good faith, courts should
dismiss the case. The EEOC concedes that it has a duty to conciliate
before filing suit,3 and Title VII makes clear that conciliation is the
preferred method of resolving charges of discrimination.4  The EEOC
maintains, however, that nothing in the statute suggests that courts
should review the EEOC's pre-suit efforts to resolve discrimination
charges; on the contrary, Title VII defines conciliation as an "informal"
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3, 2000e-5(a) (2012).
2. See, e.g., EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 179 (7th Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 2872 (June 30, 2014) (No. 13-1019). Mach Mining argued that
"judges must police the EEOC, lest it either abandon conciliation altogether or misuse it
by advancing unrealistic and even extortionate settlement demands." Id. In EEOC v.
Agro Distribution, LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 468 (5th Cir. 2009), the court found that the
EEOC made "an insupportable demand for compensatory damages as a weapon to force
settlement."
3. Brief for the Respondent at 9, Mach Mining, 738 F.3d 171 (No. 13-1019).
4. Brief for Petitioner at 15, Mach Mining, 738 F.3d 171 (No. 13-1019) (citing
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974)) (noting "cooperation and
voluntary compliance" as the preferred means of achieving equal employment
opportunity).
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process and invests the EEOC with substantial discretion to determine
when to accept or reject offers to settle and when to file suit.5 While
most circuit courts of appeals have assumed that some judicial review of
the conciliation process is appropriate, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit concluded that courts should not review the conciliation
process. In EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC,6 the Seventh Circuit rightly
placed the primary goal of Title VII-resolving discrimination issues in
the workplace-over the delays and distractions that result from the
defense that employers have manufactured-failure to conciliate!
In Mach Mining, the defendant-employer argued that the EEOC's
failure to conciliate was an affirmative defense to charges of sex
discrimination. In a bold decision that parts ways with decisions by
other circuit courts of appeals, the Seventh Circuit held that the EEOC's
conciliation efforts are a matter of agency discretion and are not subject
to judicial review.9  Courts in other circuits have reviewed the
conciliation process without specifically addressing the issue of whether
Title VII allows such review."l These courts have required that the
EEOC demonstrate at least a good faith effort to conciliate.
While the most significant split is between the Seventh Circuit and
circuits that have recognized some level of judicial review of conciliation
efforts, other substantial differences exist among the circuits. Notably,
the circuits disagree on the scope of litigation when conciliation fails, as
well as the remedy a court should fashion if it finds the EEOC failed to
conciliate in good faith."l Some courts have dismissed the EEOC's suit
or granted summary judgment to the employer upon finding that the
EEOC did not conciliate in good faith. 2 Other courts have found that
5. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 3, at 9-31.
6. EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 171-184 (7th Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 2872 (June 30, 2014) (No. 13- 1019).
7. Id. at 171.
8. Id. at 171-72.
9. Id. at 172.
10. See infra Part 1II.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See EEOC v. Peoplemark, Inc., 732 F. 3d 584, 621 (6th Cir. 2013); EEOC v.
CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 664 (8th Cir. 2012); EEOC v. Agro
Distribution, LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 469-70 (5th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Asplundh Tree
Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1261 (1 lth Cir. 2003); EEOC v. Original Honeybaked Ham
Co. of Ga., 918 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1176 (D. Colo. 2013); EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P.
(Bloomberg III), 778 F. Supp. 2d 458, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Attorneys from Seyfarth
Shaw LLP maintain that the EEOC has become increasingly aggressive in its efforts.
"Especially troubling," according to the firm, "are instances where the EEOC has rushed
to file high-profile lawsuits that splash allegations of systemic discrimination across
headlines, only to have its claims dismissed altogether or whittled down to a single
claimant." Christopher J. Degroff, Reema Kapur & Gerald A. Maatman, Jr., The Top 5
Most Intriguing Decisions in EEOC Cases of 2013 (and a Pre-Publication Preview of
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the better remedy is to stay the case to provide additional time for
conciliation."
The EEOC's duty to conciliate raises additional questions when the
EEOC brings claims under § 70614 of Title VII on behalf of unidentified
victims. Courts have reached different conclusions about the extent of
the EEOC's duty in such cases.'5  Some courts have found that the
employer must have the opportunity to conciliate claims for each
aggrieved individual.16 Other courts have found that the EEOC need
only give the employer adequate notice of the nature of the "class
claims."'7  This issue is particularly important given the EEOC's
emphasis on systemic discrimination and the U.S. Supreme Court's
recent decision in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes,18 a decision that makes it
more difficult to bring class action suits.'9 Section 706 allows the EEOC
to bring claims alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination, as well as
claims for individual relief, without the strictures of Rule 2320 class
certification.2' While the Supreme Court did not address whether the
EEOC must provide an opportunity for conciliation on each aggrieved
individual before filing suit, its decision regarding judicial review of
conciliation efforts will have a substantial impact on this issue. The
actual question presented to the Court is: "[w]hether and to what extent
may a court enforce the EEOC's mandatory duty to conciliate
discrimination claims before filing suit."
22
This Article considers how courts hould interpret the EEOC's duty
to conciliate and the implications of the Supreme Court's decision in
Mach Mining. The Article focuses primarily on cases arising under Title
VII, but some cases arising under other statutes administered by the
EEOC are relevant, because the administrative process is the same for
Our Annual EEOC Litigation Report), SEYFARTH SHAW (Dec. 31, 2013),
http://www.seyfarth.com/publications/3794.
13. See EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527, 535 (10th Cir. 1978); EEOC v. Bass Pro
Outdoor World, LLC, 1 F. Supp. 3d 647, 671 (S.D. Tex. 2014); EEOC v. Evans Fruit
Co., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1115-16 (E.D. Wash. 2012).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2012).
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part IV.A.
17. See infra Part IV.B.
18. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2541-67 (2011).
19. Id. at 2556-57 (holding that courts should consider dissimilarities to determine
whether there is a common question for Rule 23 purposes and that claims for monetary
relief may not be certified if the monetary relief is not incidental to the injunctive or
declaratory relief).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
21. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 320 (1980).
22. Question Presented Report, Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 738 F.3d 171 (7th
Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2872 (June 30, 2014) (No. 13-1019), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/13-01019qp.pdf.
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the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") 23 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").24 Part I will introduce
the specifics of the EEOC's pre-suit obligations. Part II will summarize
the court's decision in Mach Mining. Part III will then identify the key
differences among the circuit courts of appeals in addressing judicial
review of conciliation efforts. This Part will expand on the Seventh
Circuit's conclusion that in reviewing conciliation efforts, courts intrude
on the informality of the process and the agency discretion that the
statute calls for. Subsequently, Part IV will summarize the different
approaches courts have taken in cases where the EEOC includes
unidentified individuals as aggrieved parties in a lawsuit. Part V will
maintain that courts should follow the Seventh Circuit's approach, which
holds that the EEOC satisfies its statutory duty to conciliate by pleading
that it has complied with the obligation. Part V will also support the
EEOC's right to bring claims on behalf of unidentified parties because
this practice allows the EEOC to more effectively address systemic
discrimination. Finally, Part VI will conclude that judicial evaluation of
conciliation efforts creates an unwarranted hurdle to the resolution of
discrimination claims and interferes with the EEOC's ability to resolve
claims of systemic discrimination. An Addendum outlines the U.S.
Supreme Court's recent decision in Mach Mining and the extent to which
it resolves issues regarding the EEOC's duty to conciliate.
I. THE EEOC'S PRE-SUIT OBLIGATIONS
When Title VII was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,25 the EEOC's role was limited to addressing unlawful employment
practices through "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
persuasion.,26  Congress aimed to encourage employers to comply
voluntarily with Title VII. 27 In 1972, recognizing that its hope for
employers' voluntary compliance was "overly optimistic," Congress
expanded the EEOC's enforcement powers by authorizing the agency to
bring a civil action in federal district court against private employers
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012).
24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2012).
25. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-
266 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15).
26. Civil Rights Act § 706(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)); see
also Gen. Tel., 446 U.S. at 325; Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355,
358 (1977).
27. See Gen. Tel., 446 U.S. at 325-26 (discussing Title VII's initial enactment in
1964 limiting EEOC authority to "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
persuasion" and 1972 amendments to § 706 creating meaningful enforcement powers
with a right of action against private employers).
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suspected of violating Title VII. 28 Title VII, as amended, preserves an
individual's right to pursue his or her action but also authorizes the
EEOC to file suit on behalf of the individual or on its own initiative if it
believes that an employer engaged in a pattern or practice of
29discrimination.
The EEOC resolves the majority of its cases through mediation.30
In some cases, however, the EEOC may opt to file suit, particularly if the
suit is of the type identified as a top priority in the EEOC's Strategic
Enforcement Plan ("SEP"). In the 2013-2016 SEP, the EEOC identified
preventing systemic discrimination as one of its top priorities.3
28. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012)).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e). The Supreme Court has explained that the private right
of action was retained so that individuals could escape from the administrative action if it
was taking too long. See Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 362-63. The EEOC may also file
suit on behalf of an individual who chooses not o file charges due to fear of employer
retaliation. See EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 62 (1984).
30. See Strategic Enforcement Plan FY 2013-2016, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N 13, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/sep.pdf (last visited
Apr. 17, 2015) [hereinafter SEP]. In 2012, 11,380 charges went o mediation, and 76%
of the cases were resolved through the mediation process. Id. Authority to negotiate
settlements and conciliation agreements, issue no cause findings, and make
determinations regarding reasonable cause in most cases are delegated to district directors
under the agency's regulations. Id. at 20 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1601 (2014)). The General
Counsel retains significant authority to commence or intervene in litigation with some
oversight by the EEOC in cases where there is a significant expenditure or public
controversy. Id. The General Counsel may delegate cases to regional attorneys for the
purpose of litigation. Id. at 21; see also Kevin P. McGowan, EEOC Officials, Attorneys
Discuss Priorities Under Agency's Strategic Enforcement Plan, [2014] Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA), No. 11, at C-l, C-2 (Jan. 16, 2014) (discussing the EEOC's SEP and EEOC
General Counsel P. David Lopez noting its priority of eliminating discriminatory barriers
to employment, and his opinion that issue of affirmative defense to pre-suit obligations
remains important despite Mach Mining).
31. See SEP, supra note 30, at 12. The EEOC sets priority charge handling
procedures and devotes greater resources to and focuses attention on the areas set as
meritorious priority matters in the SEP. Id. The EEOC's national priorities include: (1)
"Eliminating Barriers in Recruitment and Hiring" (regarding class-based practices that
adversely impact protected groups); (2) "Protecting Immigrant, Migrant and Other
Vulnerable Workers" (from, for example, disparate pay, job segregation, or harassment);
(3) "Addressing Emerging and Developing Issues" (noting the aging of the workforce
and other trends or events that impact employment practices such as disability
accommodation, including pregnancy-related disability discrimination, and coverage of
LGBT discrimination under Title VII sex discrimination); (4) "Enforcing Equal Pay
Laws" (targeting compensation systems and practices that discriminate based upon
gender through directed investigations and Commissioner charges); (5) "Preserving
Access to the Legal System" (targeting policies and practices that inhibit exercise of
rights or impede EEOC investigative and enforcement efforts including: retaliation,
overly broad waivers, settlement procedures that bar filing EEOC charges, or providing
information to EEOC, and failure to retain records); (6) "Preventing Harassment Through
Systemic Enforcement and Targeted Outreach" (targeting systemic enforcement and
outreach to educate against future violations). id. at 9-10.
2015]
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According to the EEOC, systemic discrimination involves "a pattern or
practice, policy, or class case where the alleged discrimination has a
broad impact on an industry, profession, company or geographic area."
32
Title VII identifies several pre-suit obligations for the EEOC. First,
the EEOC must receive a charge of discrimination, filed by the aggrieved
party or by a Commissioner of the EEOC, alleging an unlawful
employment practice.33 The EEOC must then notify the employer of the
charge and begin an investigation.34 If, after investigation, the EEOC
determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is
true, it "shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful
employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation,
and persuasion.35 The statute specifies that the informal conciliation
procedures are confidential, that subsequent proceedings may not use
information from conciliation as evidence, and that a violation of the
confidentiality provision involves criminal penalties.36 If the EEOC is
unable to reach a conciliation agreement "acceptable to the
Commission,37 it may file a civil suit against the employer.38
The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized that, although the EEOC
has the authority to bring suits against employers reasonably suspected of
violating Title VII, conciliation and voluntary compliance are the
preferred methods of resolution.39 In Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC,40 the
32. Systemic Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
http://wwwl.eeoc.gov//eeoc/systemic/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). The EEOC
provides the following examples of systemic practices:
Discriminatory barriers in recruitment and hiring; discriminatorily restricted
access to management trainee programs and to high level jobs; exclusion of
qualified women from traditionally male dominated fields of work; disability
discrimination such as unlawful pre-employment inquiries; age discrimination
in reductions in force and retirement benefits; and compliance with customer
preferences that result in discriminatory placement or assignments.
Id.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012); see Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 67 (discussing
substantive requirements for charges).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
35. Id.
36. Id. ("Any person who makes public information in violation of this subsection
shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.").
37. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
38. Id.; see also Angela D. Morrison, Misconstruing Notice in EEOC Administrative
Processing and Conciliation, 14 NEV. L.J. 785, 787-90 (2014) (reviewing the EEOC
charge handling process and confidential conciliation process).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) ("If... the Commission has been unable to secure
from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the
Commission may bring a civil action against .... "); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) ("Cooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the
preferred means for achieving [Title VII's] goal."); see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S.
557, 581 (2009) ("[W]e have recognized as Congress's intent that 'voluntary compliance'
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Court recognized that "voluntary compliance" could end "discrimination
far more quickly than could litigation proceeding at its often ponderous
pace."41  In Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC,42 the Court,
referring to Title VII's "integrated, multistep enforcement procedure,43
stated that the EEOC is "required by law to refrain from commencing a
civil action until it has discharged its administrative duties," which
include "settling disputes, if possible, in an informal, noncoercive
fashion." 4 Nevertheless, the Court has recognized that "once a charge is
filed... the EEOC is in command of the process... [and] the master of
its own case.45 In EEOC v. Waffle House,46 the Court stated that the
statute clearl i "confers on the agency the authority to evaluate the
strength of the public interest at stake."47
The EEOC has not developed any regulations to define its duties to
conciliate, except that it must "notify the respondent in writing" when it
determines that conciliation will not resolve the charge.48 The EEOC
maintains that its practice is to include an invitation to conciliate in its
letter informing the employer that it has found reasonable cause to
believe the employer engaged in an unlawful employment practice.
49
According to the EEOC, these two documents, the reasonable cause
letter with its invitation to negotiate and the notification that conciliation
has failed, should serve as "bookends" that "show the Commission has
attempted conciliation" without violating the confidentiality required by
the. statute.5°
The EEOC's Quality Control Plan ("QCP") gives some indication
of what criteria it considers for quality investigations and conciliations.5
According to the QCP, a quality investigation is one in which:
1. The Commission identifies the bases, issues, and relevant
allegations of the alleged unlawful employment action in a charge.
be 'the preferred means of achieving the objectives of Title VII."' (quoting Local No. 93,
Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 515 (1986)).
40. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982).
41. Id. at 228.
42. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
43. Id. at 359.
44. Id. at 368.
45. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 291 (2002).
46. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
47. Id. at 291.
48. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25 (2014).
49. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 3, at 20.
50. Id. at20-21.
51. See Quality Control Plan 2013 Draft Principles, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/quality controlplan2013.cfn (last visited
Apr. 17, 2015).
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2. The Commission conducts an investigation consistent with its
Priority Charge Handling Procedures (PCHP).
3. The Commission applies the law to the facts to determine if there
is reasonable cause to believe that unlawful employment
discrimination has occurred.
4. The Commission communicates with the Charging Party and the
Respondent (or with their lawyers, if represented) to obtain
sufficient information to make its determination.
The plan defines a quality conciliation as one in which:
1. The Commission seeks targeted, equitable relief
2. The Commission informs the parties of the proposed categories of
relief and how monetary terms were reached.
3. The Commission responds appropriately to reasonable offers made
52by the parties.
The EEOC cautions that the QCP is intended for internal guidance
only and is not to be used to determine whether investigations or
conciliations were carried out in good faith.53 Nevertheless, some courts
have used criteria similar to that specified in the QCP to assess
investigation and conciliation efforts.54
To summarize, it is clear that conciliation is the preferred method of
resolving discrimination charges. Title VII requires the EEOC to resolve
charges through "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
persuasion.55 If the EEOC is unable to reach an agreement acceptable
to the agency, it may bring a civil suit.56 The EEOC has not promulgated
any regulations to further define its duties to conciliate. This information
led the Seventh Circuit to conclude that nothing in Title VII or Supreme
Court interpretations of the statute compels judicial review of
conciliation efforts.57 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit found that the text





54, See discussion infra at Part III.B.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012).
56. Id. § 2000e-5(0(1).
57. EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 172 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. granted,
134 S. Ct. 2872 (June 30, 2014) (No. 13-1019).
58. Id. at 174-80.
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II. EEOC v. MA4CHMNNG: FAILURE To CONCILIATE IS NOT SUBJECT
TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
Brooke Petkas was truly a coal miner's daughter; her father,
grandfathers, and great-grandfathers were all coal miners.59 Petkas had
worked in mines in Southern Illinois, Indiana, and Pennsylvania since
2003.60 In 2006, she applied to work for Mach Mining when the
company began operations near her hometown in Illinois.6' Petkas stated
that she sent several resumes to Mach Mining but never got an
interview.
62
In 2008, Petkas filed a complaint with the EEOC, alleging that
Mach Mining failed to hire her because of her sex.63 The mine employed
130 miners, all men.64 Although the mine was newly constructed, it had
neither bathrooms nor changing facilities for women.65 After Petkas
filed with the EEOC, the EEOC found that at least 60 women had
experiences similar to that of Petkas.66  The EEOC found there was
reasonable cause to believe that Mach Mining had discriminated against
female job applicants at its mine near Johnston City, Illinois. 67 In 2010,
the EEOC began informal conciliation, but in September of 2011, it
informed Mach Mining that the conciliation efforts were unsuccessful.68
As a result, the EEOC filed suit on behalf of Petkas and a class of female
job applicants.69 Mach Mining maintained that the case should be
dismissed because the EEOC failed to conciliate in good faith before
filing suit.70 The EEOC moved for summary judgment on the failure to
conciliate claim.71
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, granting summary
judgment for the EEOC, found that an alleged failure to conciliate is not
an affirmative defense to the merits of a discrimination suit.72 The court
reasoned that the language of the statute, the lack of a meaningful







64. Malkovich, supra note 59.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 173 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. granted,
134 S. Ct. 2872 (June 30, 2014) (No. 13-1019).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 172.
71. Id.
72. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 172.
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standard for courts to apply, and the overall statutory scheme weighed
against allowing the affirmative defense.73 According to the court,
allowing the defense would encourage employers to avoid liability for
unlawful discrimination through "protracted and ultimately pointless
litigation over whether the EEOC tried hard enough to settle.
'" 74
The court first considered the text of Title VII. 75 Not only did the
court find no express language in the statute to support an affirmative
defense, but it also found that language in the statute clearly
demonstrates deference to the agency's decision-making powers.76 The
court noted that the statute instructs the EEOC to "'endeavor to
eliminate' discriminatory practices 'by informal methods"' and that the
conciliation agreement had to be "'acceptable to the Commission."'77
According to the court, "[ilt would be difficult for Congress to have
packed more deference to agency decision-making into so few lines of
text.
78
The court also found that the statute provided no workable legal
standard for judicial review of the conciliation process, further
supporting its position that the process is a matter of agency discretion.79
The court rejected Mach Mining's argument that it should use a good
faith analysis similar to that employed under the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA"). 80  The court noted that the NLRA's
requirement that employers and unions negotiate in good faith is an
"explicit statutory command," while Title VII contains no similar
81requirement.
Furthermore, the court noted that courts that have recognized an
implied affirmative defense for failure to conciliate in good faith have
attempted to distinguish between the conciliation process and the
substance of the conciliation.82 The court found that a meaningful
review of the process would necessarily involve information about the
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 174-75.
76. Id. at 174.
77. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 174 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(b), (0(1) (2012)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 175-78.
80. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012)); Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 176.
81. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 176 (explaining that the NLRA outlines specific
violations of the Act such that it is an unfair labor practice if either employers or unions
fail to bargain in good faith); see 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2012) (outlining employer and union
unfair labor practices and the duty to bargain in good faith under § 8 of the Act).
82. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 176-77 (citing EEOC v. Hibbing Taconite Co., 266
F.R.D. 260,273 (D. Minn. 2009)).
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substance of the parties' positions, including the reasonableness of offers
and the use of confidential and inadmissible evidence.83 Such review
would necessarily undermine the EEOC's discretion in choosing whether
84or not to settle the case.
The court found support for its position in decisions addressing
challenges to agency actions under the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA").85 The court referred to Supreme Court decisions finding that
there is no judicial review "'if the statute is drawn so that a court would
have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's
exercise of discretion."'' 86 The court found its decision consistent with
these APA cases because "the statutory directive to attempt conciliation
is so similar to those open-ended grants of authority that courts have
found committed to agency discretion by law and thus not subject to
judicial review under the APA. 87
The court concluded that recognizing an affirmative defense for
failure to conciliate would undermine the informal conciliation process
required by Title VII by turning the process into "endless disputes over
whether the EEOC did enough before going to court. '5  This result,
according to the court, would conflict with the Supreme Court's
interpretation that Congress intended "voluntary compliance [to] be the
preferred means of achieving the objectives of Title VII." 89 The court
stated that in some cases, especially those in which the underlying claim
of discrimination is strong, an employer may build its case around the
EEOC's alleged failure to conciliate to escape liability, rather than
engage in meaningful settlement discussions.9"
The court found no merit to Mach Mining's contention that "judges
must police the EEOC, lest it either abandon conciliation altogether or
misuse it by advancing unrealistic and even extortionate settlement
83. Id. at 177.
84. Id.
85. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79404, 60 Stat. 237
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.); Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 177.
86. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 177 (quoting Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600
(1988)). The Mach Mining court found that even though there is a presumption of
judicial review, its conclusion was consistent with Supreme Court decisions recognizing
the "'presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action is just that-a
presumption."' Id. at 178 (quoting Block v. Cmty Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349
(1984)). The presumption may be overcome "'whenever the congressional intent to
preclude judicial review is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme."' Id (quoting
Block, 467 U.S. at 351). Title VII, the court stated, provides no standards to indicate that
Congress intended judicial review of the conciliation process. Id.
87. Id. at 177.
88. Id. at 179.
89. Id. at 178 (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 581 (2009)).
90. Id. at 179.
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demands."91  The court cited statistical evidence to indicate that the
EEOC uses its limited resources to bring suit in only a small percentage
of cases.92 In 2012, the court noted, the EEOC "attempted conciliation in
4207 cases, was unsuccessful in 2616, yet filed suit on the merits in just
12 2 . "9.
The court noted that the effect of an affirmative defense for failure
to conciliate is more likely to encourage employers to strategically avoid
settlement with the hope that the case will be dismissed altogether.
94
Furthermore, the defense would do little to deter EEOC misconduct,
according to the court, while potentially allowing meritorious cases of
discrimination to go unaddressed.95  In short, the court found that
dismissal of the case for "insufficient process" was "too final and drastic
a remedy.96 The court noted that the Supreme Court has articulated a
clear standard that "'the remedy for a deficiency in a process is more
process, not letting one party off the hook entirely."'
97
The Seventh Circuit's decision is bold in contrast to approaches
taken by other courts. The Seventh Circuit asserted, "[i]f the EEOC has
pled on the face of its complaint that it has complied with all procedures
required under Title VII and the relevant documents are facially
sufficient, our review of those procedures is satisfied.,98 In its review of
the Seventh Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court had to decide whether
such facial compliance satisfied the EEOC's pre-suit obligations.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE STATUTORY SCHEME
In deciding whether the EEOC's conciliation efforts are subject to
judicial review, the Supreme Court had three models from which to
choose. First, the Seventh Circuit asserted that courts should not review
conciliation efforts. It maintained that the EEOC discharges its pre-suit
obligations by stating that it has done so in its complaint and submitting
documents that are facially sufficient.99 Second, three circuits have
91. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 179.
92. Id. at 180.
93. Id. (citing All Statutes: FY 1997 Through FY 2012, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/all.cfm (last
visited Dec. 20, 2013); EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1997 Through FY 2012, U.S.
EQUAL EMP' T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm (last visited Dec. 20,
2013)).
94. Id. at 183-84.
95. id. at 184.
96. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 184.
97. Id. (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004)).




concluded that the EEOC must demonstrate a good faith effort to
conciliate.'00 This standard of review has been labeled the deferential
standard of review.'0 The Ninth Circuit has not yet adopted a view, but
one district court within the circuit has indicated that it leans toward the
deferential standard.10 2  Third, three circuits have followed a more
stringent approach that uses a three-part inquiry to determine whether the
EEOC acted in a reasonable manner in attempting to conciliate the
charge.'0 3  In applying either variation of a good faith standard,
deferential or stringent, courts within these circuits have recognized the
importance of the conciliation process as the means of achieving the
statute's goal of "voluntary compliance," while also recognizing that
Congress gave the EEOC broad discretion in how it goes about the
process of conciliation. Parts III.A-B set forth the deferential and the
more stringent standards of judicial review of conciliation efforts. Part
III.C concludes that decisions employing either standard of review have
been highly subjective, with courts assessing conciliation efforts with
varying degrees of deference to the EEOC.
A. The Deferential Standard
The Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits require that the EEOC's
conciliation efforts meet a minimal level of good faith. 104 Courts have
100. See, e.g., EEOC v. Keco Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097, 1102 (6th Cir. 1984);
EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1979); EEOC v. Zia Co.,
582 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1978).
101. See Elizabeth Dunn, No Longer a Paper Tiger: The EEOC and Its Statutory
Duty To Conciliate, 63 EMORY L.J. 455, 462 (2013) (categorizing the views of the Sixth
and Tenth Circuits as the "deferential standard of review").
102. In EEOC v. Alia Corp., 8242 F. Supp. 2d 1243 (E.D. Cal. 2012), the court stated
that, "district courts in this circuit have generally tilted toward the approach taken by the
Sixth and Tenth circuits, affording the EEOC wide deference in discharging its duty to
conciliate." Id. at 1255. In EEOC v. Swissport Fueling, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (D.
Ariz. 2013), the court stated that review of the EEOC's effort to fulfill its statutory duties
is appropriate. Id. at 1025 (citing EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co., 669 F.2d 605, 608 (9th
Cir. 1982)). The court found that "the EEOC's investigatory and conciliatory
obligations, standing alone, may be immune from judicial review" but that "the Ninth
Circuit has held that once the EEOC begins litigation, its investigation, determination,
and conciliation are subject to judicial review as 'jurisdictional conditions precedent to
suit."' Id. at 1035 (citing Pierce Packing, 669 F.2d at 608). In Swissport, the court took
note of the circuit split on standards to evaluate conciliation efforts but did not adopt
either standard, finding that the EEOC had not met its pre-suit obligations under either
standard. Id. at 1037.
103. See, e.g., EEOC v. Agro Distrib., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 467-69 (5th Cir. 2009);
EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1259-61 (1 th Cir. 2003); EEOC v.
Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1534-35 (2d Cir. 1996).
104. Keco, 748 F.2d at 1102; Radiator Specialty, 610 F.2d at 183; Zia Co., 582 F.2d
at 533.
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not provided any specifics on how to determine whether the EEOC
fulfilled its duties in good faith, but it appears that under this standard,
there is no scrutiny of how the process was conducted. For example, in
EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Co.,'05 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit found that the law requires "no more than a good faith attempt at
conciliation."106 The court held that a good faith attempt was made when
the EEOC sent a reasonable cause determination letter with an invitation
to conciliate, discussed charges during a tour of the employer's plant,
and suggested a meeting to discuss an agreement.10 7  Because the
employer failed to respond to the EEOC's express overtures to
conciliate, the EEOC was free to file suit, according to the court.
1 0 8
Similarly, in EEOC v. Keco Industries, Inc.,'0 9 the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit stated that "the EEOC must make a good faith effort
to conciliate the claim. However, once the employer rejects the
conciliation attempts, the EEOC is free to file suit under Title VII.""
The district court had dismissed the suit on the grounds that the
investigation was incomplete and the employer did not have a
meaningful opportunity to conciliate.1' The determination of failure to
conciliate was based on a magistrate's report indicating that "the EEOC
conciliation attempts consisted solely of 'placing . . boilerplate
language regarding the class discrimination claim into the conciliation
agreement.""1 2 The Sixth Circuit reversed, emphasizing that the district
court "should only determine whether the EEOC made an attempt at
conciliation" and that the "form and substance of those conciliations is
within the discretion of the EEOC.' 1 3 In Serrano v. Cintas Corp.,14 a
more recent decision, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Keco and
stated that "'the nature and extent of an EEOC investigation . .. is a
matter within the discretion of th[e] agency."' 5 The court found that
when an employer rejects the EEOC's offer to conciliate and the
105. EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1979).
106. Id. at 183.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. EEOC v. Keco Indust., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir. 1984).
110. Id. at 1102.
111. See id. at 1099.
112. See id. at 1101 (alteration in original).
113. Id. at 1102.
114. Serrano v. Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d 884 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 92
(2013).
115. Id. at 904 (second alteration in original) (quoting Keco, 748 F.2d at 1100).
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proposed conciliation agreement, he "'EEOC is under no duty to attempt
further conciliation."
1 1 6
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in EEOC v. Zia Co.,
117
also held that the EEOC had a duty to conciliate in good faith.'
18
Because the law states that the EEOC "shall seek conciliation," the court
noted that "it is inconceivable to us that good faith efforts are not
required."1 9 In Zia, the alleged lack of good faith on the EEOC's part
was based on the fact that the EEOC litigation officials, knowing that a
conciliation agreement was imminent, acted improperly in not giving the
parties more time to complete the agreement.120 The appropriate remedy,
according to the court, was to give the parties more time to reach an
agreement. 1
2 1
The approach taken by these courts is not unlike the Seventh
Circuit's approach in Mach Mining. Although these decisions do not go
as far as the Seventh Circuit by expressly rejecting failure to conciliate as
an affirmative defense, they steer clear of engaging in an inquiry into the
substance of the negotiations. The courts in Radiator Specialty Co. and
Keco were satisfied that some attempt to conciliate took place, remaining
close to the Seventh Circuit's approach, which requires only that the
EEOC's documents be "facially sufficient."'2 2 In Zia, although the court
found that the EEOC did not exercise good faith, the court directed the
parties to resume conciliation.1 23  This remedy is consistent with the
Seventh Circuit's suggestion that a procedural wrong can be cured by "a
short stay to allow the parties to pursue conciliation further."'
' 24
B. The More Stringent Standard
Some circuit courts of appeals recognize a second standard of
review, known as the "more stringent standard." The Second, Fifth, and
116. Id. at 905 (quoting Keco, 748 F.2d at 1101-02). The court noted that the
company's three-year silence after the EEOC's proposal "can reasonably be interpreted
as rejection," and thus, "the EEOC satisfied its administrative prerequisites to suit." Id.
117. EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1978).
118. ldat533.
119. Id.
120. Id at 534. The case involved unique circumstances. Zia, the private employer,
was willing to sign a conciliation agreement with the EEOC, but, because a contractual
agreement required the Atomic Energy Commission ("AEC") to satisfy any back pay
agreements, Zia needed the AEC's approval. Id. at 530.
121. Id at 534.
122. EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 184 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. granted,
134 S. Ct. 2872 (June 30, 2014) (No. 13-1019).
123. Zia, 582 F.2d at 533. The court noted that it retained jurisdiction to make
findings and orders without retrial and without creating statute of limitations problems on
individual claims if further conciliation efforts failed. Id.
124. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 184.
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Eleventh Circuits have reviewed conciliation efforts under a good faith
standard, aided by a three-part inquiry. 125  The three-part inquiry was
established by the Fifth Circuit in Marshall v. Sun Oil Co. (Delaware),26
a case involving age discrimination under the ADEA, which, like Title
VII, requires efforts to conciliate before filing suit.127 The inquiry asks
whether the government agency: (1) outlined to the employer its cause
for believing the statute has been violated; (2) gave the employer a
chance to comply voluntarily; and (3) responded in a reasonable and
flexible manner to reasonable questions or offers by the respondent.
128
Interestingly, the three-part inquiry corresponds closely to the internal
guidelines of the EEOC's QCP.129 The third component of the inquiry,
the requirement that the EEOC respond reasonably and flexibly to the
employer, appears to be the critical inquiry and one that has raised
considerable problems for the EEOC.
In EEOC v. Klingler Electric Corp., 130 the Fifth Circuit stated that it
is "appropriate ... to inquire into the adequacy of the EEOC's efforts to
conciliate.' 131 Adapting the three-part inquiry to Title VII, the court
stated that "the fundamental question is the reasonableness and
responsiveness of the EEOC's conduct under all the circumstances."'
' 32
The court found that in this case it was necessary to make a "thorough
inquiry into [the] relevant facts of the conciliation negotiations.'33 The
employer attempted to show that it had signed a conciliation
agreement.134  But the facts showed that the employer's purported
acceptance of the agreement contained an alteration that was
objectionable to the EEOC and the charging party.135 The Fifth Circuit
125. See EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003);
EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1534 (2d Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Klingler
Electric Corp., 636 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981) (per curiam).
126. Marshall v. Sun Oil Co. (Del.), 605 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1979).
127. The ADEA requires that before filing suit the Secretary seek voluntary
compliance "through informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion." 29
U.S.C. § 626(b) (2012). Sun Oil moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
Secretary of Labor's attempts to conciliate charges of age discrimination were
inadequate. Marshall, 605 F.2d at 1332.
128. Marshall, 605 F.2d at 1339.
129. See supra notes 51 and 52 and accompanying text.
130. EEOC v. Klingler Electric Corp., 636 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981) (per
curiam).
131. Id. at 107. The Fifth Circuit noted further that there is no requirement that the
EEOC specifically aver in the pleadings that conciliation has failed; to the contrary, a
general averment that conditions precedent to filing suit have been met is adequate. Id. at
106.
132. Id. at 107.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 106.
135. Klingler, 636 F.2d at 106.
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remanded for the trial court to inquire into the relevant facts regarding
the materiality of the information the employer added to the conciliation
agreement, the history of negotiations on that item, the nature of the
EEOC's counter-proposal, and the employer's response.136
In EEOC v. Agro Distribution, L.L. C.,137 however, the Fifth Circuit
found that the EEOC did not attempt conciliation in good faith because it
failed to respond in a reasonable and flexible manner to the reasonable
attitudes of the employer.138 In Agro, the court looked closely at the
behavior of the negotiating parties. It held that the EEOC did not attempt
conciliation in good faith because it "abandoned its role as a neutral
investigator" and made "an insupportable demand for compensatory
damages as a weapon to force settlement."'139 The court noted that the
claimant's own deposition indicated that no violation of the ADA had
occurred and no reasonable jury could conclude that the employer had
denied the employee reasonable accommodation.40  The Fifth Circuit
found that dismissal and an award of attorneys' fees were appropriate
because the EEOC failed to act in good faith.1
41
In EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 42 the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit also upheld the dismissal of a claim because the
EEOC had failed to conciliate in good faith.143 For nearly three years,
the EEOC investigated a claim of racial harassment and retaliation as
well as pay disparity and concluded that there was reasonable cause to
believe the allegations were true.144 The EEOC sent a conciliation
agreement o the employer's general counsel giving the company 12 days
to reply.145 The company's general counsel retained local counsel who
contacted the EEOC, requesting additional time to conciliate. 46 The
EEOC did not respond and informed the employer that "further
conciliation efforts would be futile or non-productive."' 147 The court
employed the same three-part test as the Fifth Circuit did in Klingler and
136. Id. at 107.
137. EEOC v. Agro Distrib., LLC, 555 F. 3d 462 (5th Cir. 2009).
138. Id. at 468.
139. Id. It should be noted that the EEOC does not conciliate until it has found
reasonable cause, and once the EEOC has found such cause, it is no longer a "neutral
investigator" but an agency seeking to eliminate discrimination. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24(a)
(2014).
140. Agro, 555 F.3d at 471.
141. Id. at 469.
142. EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256 (11 th Cir. 2003).
143. Id. at 1261. The court also upheld an award of attorneys' fees for the employer.
Id.
144. Id. at 1258.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Asplundh, 340 F.3d at 1258-59.
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emphasized "the reasonableness and responsiveness of the EEOC's
conduct under all the circumstances."1 48 The court found that the EEOC
did not act in good faith and that its conduct "smacks more of coercion
than of conciliation.1 49 The court noted that the EEOC did not provide
the employer with notice of a theory of liability, as the racial comments
were made by an employee of another company; that the EEOC
unreasonably denied a request to extend the conciliation period; and that
the EEOC's proposed remedy was "impossible to perform." 50 Finding
that the EEOC did not fulfill its statutory duty to attempt conciliation in
good faith, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's dismissal of
the case and an award of attorneys' fees.'5
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also employs the three-
part inquiry to assess good faith attempts to conciliate. In EEOC v.
Johnson & Higgins,'52 the court decided an age discrimination claim
brought by the EEOC regarding a mandatory retirement policy for
employees serving as directors.53 Johnson & Higgins maintained that
the EEOC did not satisfy its duty to conciliate before filing suit. ' 54 The
Second Circuit found that it was "entirely appropriate" for the EEOC to
end conciliation efforts when the employer refused to provide the EEOC
with information regarding salaries in order to negotiate damages. 155 The
court found that the EEOC had fulfilled its duty by issuing its letter of
determination and inviting the employer to conciliate.156 Because the
employer refused to cooperate on the grounds that its policy was not
unlawful, the court concluded that "it was entirely appropriate for the
EEOC to end conciliation efforts at that point and file suit .... ,,157
The Seventh Circuit rejected the approach used by the Second,
Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits because it found that the approach
necessarily required inquiry into the substantive nature of the EEOC's
negotiations and consequently interfered with the confidentiality
requirements of Title VII, as well as the agency's discretion to accept or
148. Id. at 1259.
149. Id. at 1260 (quoting EEOC v. Pet, Inc., 612 F.2d 1001, 1002 (5th Cir. 1980)).
150. Id. The court stated that the remedy was "impossible to perform" because the
EEOC required reinstatement and front pay for the employee when the project had ended
three years earlier. Id.
151. Id. at 1261.
152. EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529 (2d Cir. 1996).
153. Id. at 1531.
154. Id. at 1534.
155. Id. at 1535.
156. Id.
157. Johnson, 91 F.3d at 1535.
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reject settlements.158 Cases in the federal district courts, discussed next,
further demonstrate that the more stringent standard of review opens the
door to several problems highlighted by the Seventh Circuit in Mach
Mining.
C. Controversies in Applying the More Stringent Standard
Recent decisions in which courts have used the three-part inquiry in
assessing conciliation efforts demonstrate that outcomes vary depending
upon a court's subjective assessment of the reasonableness of the
requests and responses made during the conciliation process. In Mach
Mining, the Seventh Circuit warned that when courts review conciliation
efforts, they become enmeshed in trying to distinguish between the
process and substance of the conciliation, interfering not only with the
informality for which the statute explicitly calls but also with the
confidentiality it mandates.159 Some courts have embraced a full inquiry
into the parties' behavior and the details of their negotiations.160 Two
recent federal district court cases from within the Second and Fifth
Circuits demonstrate the difficulties associated with applying the more
stringent standard of review.
In a series of recent decisions from within the Second Circuit, the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dealt with
charges brought by the EEOC against Bloomberg L.P., asserting claims
of sex and pregnancy discrimination as well as retaliation under Title
VII. 161  In EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P.,'162 the court considered claims
related to sex and pregnancy discrimination and concluded that the
EEOC had fulfilled its duty to conciliate.163  Applying the Second
Circuit's rule articulated in Johnson & Higgins, the court held that where
a defendant refuses the agency's invitation to conciliate, the EEOC may
158. EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 183 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. granted,
134 S. Ct. 2872 (June 30, 2014) (No. 13-1019).
159. Id. at 177.
160. See, e.g., EEOC v. Klingler Electric Corp., 636 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. Unit A
Feb. 1981) (per curiam) (stating it was necessary to make a "thorough inquiry into [the]
relevant facts of the conciliation negotiations").
161. EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P. (Bloombergll), 751 F. Supp. 2d 628, 630 (S.D.N.Y.
2010). In EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P. (Bloomberg I), No. 07 Civ. 8383 (LAP), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 92511 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 31, 2010), the court ruled against excluding
Bloomberg's expert witnesses. However, the court ruled in favor of denying the
introduction of testimony and reports of the EEOC's experts on the basis of their minimal
probative value regarding gender stereotyping and their tendency to prejudice the jury, in
light of the unreliability of data and lack of relevance. Bloomberg 1, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 92511, at *55-56.
162. EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P. (Bloombergll), 751 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
163. Id. at 630, 638.
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proceed to litigation.164  The court noted that "when the parties'
proposals and discussions are so divergent as to seem irreconcilable, the
courts will not require the EEOC to conduct Sisyphean negotiations to
meet its statutory mandate to conciliate." 1
65
In Bloomberg, however, the court found that the EEOC failed to
conciliate the retaliation claims in good faith. 166 During the course of
negotiations, Bloomberg informed the EEOC that it looked forward to
working with the agency to "achieve a resolution" while at the same time
noting that it was "not in a position" to offer monetary relief.161 While
the EEOC held out for a "reasonable" response on the monetary
proposals,68 Bloomberg repeatedly sought more information regarding
the claims in order to formulate a counterproposal.169 After five months
of correspondence and an unproductive meeting, the EEOC sent a letter
stating that the conciliation efforts were unsuccessful.170 The court found
that the EEOC failed to "respond in a reasonable and flexible manner to
the employer in conciliation.'' 7  The court noted that the EEOC's
proposal totaled over $41 million and that Bloomberg's requests for
more information about the charges and the basis for the agency's
determination were reasonable.72 According to the court, the EEOC
"stonewalled" Bloomberg's reasonable requests for information.173 The
court found that the EEOC's failure to conciliate the retaliation claims
should result in a dismissal rather than a stay of proceedings in light of
the EEOC's "non-effort" and the futility of further attempts. 1
74
In EEOC v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC,175 a federal district
court within the Fifth Circuit considered a situation similar to that in
Bloomberg, but reached a different conclusion. Like the parties in
Bloomberg, the parties in Bass Pro engaged in months of discussions but
were millions of dollars apart during conciliation.176 As in Bloomberg,
the employer sought information that the EEOC did not provide.177 As
part of the three-part inquiry, the court considered whether the EEOC
164. Id. at 639 (citing EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1535 (2d Cir.
1996)).
165. Id. at 640.
166. Id. at 638.
167. Bloomberg 11, 751 F. Supp. 2d at 640.
168. Id. at 641.
169. Id. at 641.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Bloomberg I, 751 F. Supp. 2d at 641.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 643.
175. EEOC v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, 1 F. Supp. 3d 647 (S.D. Tex. 2014).




responded reasonably and flexibly to the employer's reasonable
requests.78  The court noted that "conciliation requires outlining the
basis of the charge," but this showing of evidence "does not require a
minitrial," and the EEOC need not reveal all of its evidence.,79 Unlike
the court in Bloomberg, the court refused to dismiss the case, finding that
a stay to allow for additional negotiations was a more appropriate
remedy. 180
The Bass Pro court stated at the outset of its decision that it was
"uneasy" with its role in evaluating whether the EEOC, an agency
"armed with enormous discretion... undertook settlement discussions in
good faith."' 8'8  Furthermore, the court was clearly impressed by the
reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Mach Mining, finding that the
decision offered "valuable insights," even though it was "clearly
somewhat at odds with binding Fifth Circuit precedent."'182 The court
agreed with the Seventh Circuit's fears that employers may strategically
seek dismissal by asserting failure to conciliate as a defense, despite the
low risk of the EEOC abandoning or abusing the conciliation process. 183
The district court expressed its belief that the courts should "keep the bar
for dismissal high" so that claimants would not be prejudiced by the
EEOC's failings.184 Dismissal, the court noted, should be reserved for
"only the truly egregious case"'185 where the EEOC's conduct was grossly
arbitrary and unreasonable.'86
The courts in Bloomberg and Bass Pro reached different
conclusions even though the facts were similar, and both courts
employed the more stringent standard of review. Arguably, Bloomberg
presented the "truly egregious" case that the court referenced in Bass
Pro. Nevertheless, the court in Bass Pro expressed unease with Fifth
Circuit precedent that allows for questioning the EEOC's discretion in
the conciliation process and admiration for the Seventh Circuit's
reasoning in Mach Mining. The court was particularly reluctant to
178. Id. at 653 (citing EEOC v. Agro Distrib., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 468 (5th Cir.
2009)); EEOC v. Klingler Electric Corp., 636 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981)
(per curiam) (citing Marshall Sun Oil Co. (Del.), 605 F.2d 1331, 1335-39 (5th Cir.
1979)).
179. Bass Pro, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 653.
180. Id. at 671.
181. Id at650.
182. Id. at 669 (citing EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171 (7th Cir. 2013),
cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2872 (June 30, 2014) (No. 13-1019)).
183. ld. at669,670.
184. Bass Pro, I F. Supp. 3d at 670, 671.
185. Id. at 671.
186. Id. at 673. The court denied Bass Pro's subsequent renewed motion for
summary judgment regarding the adequacy of the EEOC's pre-suit obligations. EEOC v.
Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, 35 F. Supp. 3d 836, 865 (S.D. Tex. 2014).
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dismiss claims rather than allowing additional time for conciliation.
These cases demonstrate that a standard based on the reasonableness and
flexibility of the EEOC's responses is highly subjective.
D. Good Faith Standards's Inconsistency with an Informal and
Confidential Conciliation Process
Despite the different levels of scrutiny applied under the
discretionary and more stringent standards, some general rules common
to both approaches emerge. Under both standards, courts have found
that the EEOC does not act in good faith if it prematurely ends
conciliation efforts.187 Also under both standards, courts have found that
if the employer refuses to conciliate or cooperate with requests from the
EEOC, the EEOC does not need to do more to satisfy its conciliation
duty prior to filing suit.188
The cases suggest that it is not only the standard the court uses to
assess the EEOC's efforts that impacts outcome, but also the facts of the
case. Courts that use the more deferential standard of judicial review
attempt to respect the deference accorded to the agency as well as the
confidentiality requirement. Nevertheless, the facts of the case and the
extent of the negotiations are more likely to dictate the scope of a court's
inquiry. If the employer has simply refused the EEOC's invitation to
conciliate, it is easy to conclude that the EEOC has fulfilled its statutory
duty by "endeavoring" to resolve the dispute before filing suit. If,
however, the negotiations have been prolonged or volatile, a court will
most likely be influenced by the parties' differing accounts of both the
process and substance of the negotiations.
Courts that follow the more stringent approach in reviewing
conciliation efforts stray far from the intentions of Title VII. Although
some cases indicate that the EEOC may have been aggressive in its
negotiating tactics, there is nothing in the statute that prohibits such
conduct. In fact, the statute's insistence on informality and
confidentiality suggests that courts should not interfere. Congress
amended Title VII because it recognized that conciliation was not always
possible. The Supreme Court recognized that the EEOC has discretion to
determine when to settle and when to file suit. In Occidental Life, the
Court stated, "the EEOC does not function simply as a vehicle for
conducting litigation on behalf of private parties; it is a federal
187. See EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1260 (1 1th Cir. 2003);
EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527, 533, 543 (10th Cir. 1978).
188. See EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1535 (2d Cir. 1996);
EEOC v. Keco Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097, 1100, 1101-02 (6th Cir. 1984); EEOC v.
Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1979).
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administrative agency charged with the responsibility of investigating
claims of employment and settling disputes, if possible, in an informal,
noncoercive fashion. '18 9 This statement not only underscores the
discretion that the EEOC has throughout the process but also recognizes
that "informal, noncoercive" settlements are not always possible.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE EEOC's PRE-SUIT DUTIES REGARDING
UNIDENTIFIED AGGRIEVED INDIVIDUALS IN § 706 CLAIMS
Some of the most contentious cases regarding the duty to conciliate
involve suits brought on behalf of one or more identified individuals and
unidentified "similarly situated individuals."'1 90 While courts generally
recognize that there must be congruence between the scope of the
EEOC's investigation and its lawsuit, they are divided on whether the
EEOC can bring a § 706 claim on behalf of individuals not identified
before a suit is filed. The Seventh Circuit's decision does not address
specifically the extent to which the EEOC must identify and attempt
conciliation for each aggrieved individual. This question, however, is
central to the discussion of judicial review of conciliation efforts, as the
EEOC is likely to pursue cases involving systemic discrimination in light
of its stated priorities.191 Even after the Supreme Court's decision in
Mach Mining, the question remains: does the EEOC have to assert that it
attempted to conciliate claims for each aggrieved individual or are its
efforts satisfied by conciliation for some named individuals and other
similarly situated individuals?'92
Systemic discrimination cases may be brought under either § 706193
or § 707194 of Title VII. Under § 707, the EEOC brings a claim alleging
a pattern or practice of systemic discrimination based largely on
statistical information.195 In cases brought under § 707, the EEOC does
not need to identify specific members of the class aggrieved by
189. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 368 (1977).
190. See discussion supra at Part III.C. The Bloomberg and Bass Pro cases both
involved unidentified aggrieved individuals.
191. Seesupra note 31.
192. Arguably, the U.S. Supreme Court's reference to the EEOC's limited duty to
specify "which employees (or what class of employees) have suffered as a result" of the
employer's alleged discriminatory practice indicates that the Court may not require
evidence of efforts to conciliate each individual claim. Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135
S. Ct. 1645, 1656 (2015).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l).
194. Id. § 2000e-6(e).
195. See Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2001).
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discriminatory practices and only injunctive remedies are allowed.
196
Section 706(f)(1) of Title VII authorizes the EEOC to seek relief on
behalf of an individual or a class of individuals.' 97 In General Telephone
Co. of the Northwest v. EEOC,'98 the Supreme Court made it clear that
this class of aggrieved individuals is not subject to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, which contains strict rules about whether or not parties
may proceed as a class.199 Concluding that Rule 23 has no impact on
such suits pursued by the EEOC, the Court stated that "the EEOC is not
merely a proxy for the victims of discrimination" but acts "to vindicate
the public interest in preventing employment discrimination.,
20 0
In bringing systemic discrimination cases, the EEOC may allege
claims under both § 706 and § 707 so that it can seek monetary damages
as well as injunctive relief.201 In such cases, employers are concerned
with finding out who is in the class of aggrieved individuals, how large
the class might be, and the amount of damages each individual might be
seeking. Employers have asserted a failure to conciliate defense when
the EEOC has not identified specific aggrieved individuals until after it
has filed suit.
20 2
Two distinct approaches to these suits have emerged. Some courts
have found that the EEOC must conciliate the claims of each aggrieved
individual before filing suit.2°3  Other courts, according broader
discretion to the EEOC, have found that appropriate notice of the type of
196. See Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Geo Grp., Inc., No. CV 10-1995-PHX-SRB,
2012 WL 8667598, at *6-8 (D. Ariz. Apr. 17, 2012) (discussing differences between §§
706 and 707 cases and remedies).
197. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l).
198. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318 (1980).
199. Id. at 326. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 states, in pertinent part:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all members only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class,
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
200. Gen. Tel., 446 U.S. at 326.
201. See Jason R. Bent, Systemic Harassment, 77 TENN. L. REv. 151, 193 (2009).
Cases such as EEOC v. Bass Pro include §§ 706 and 707 claims.
202. See, e.g., EEOC v. Swissport Fueling, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1015 (D. Ariz.
2013) (noting that EEOC began with 17 charging parties and subsequently sought to add
nine claimants and then an additional 12).
203. See EEOC v. Bloomberg (Bloomberg 1V), 967 F. Supp. 2d 802, 810 (S.D.N.Y.
2013); EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 674 (8th Cir. 2012).
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claims involved is sufficient20 4 and that additional time for conciliation is
a more appropriate remedy than dismissal.205
A. Conciliation for Each Aggrieved Individual.
In EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc.,206 the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit concluded that the EEOC did not fulfill its pre-suit
obligations because it failed to attempt conciliation regarding each victim
subsequently named in its lawsuit.207 The case was based on complaints
of severe and pervasive sexual harassment by female drivers in CRST's
New Driver Training Program.208 The EEOC notified CRST that it had
reasonable cause to believe that a class of female employees had suffered
sexual harassment, and the EEOC offered to conciliate; CRST replied
that conciliation on a class basis would be futile if CRST did not know
the identities of the alleged victims. 20 9 After the EEOC filed suit in its
own name, seeking relief for the charging party "and a class of similarly
situated female employees,' 210 the district court and the employer
repeatedly asked the EEOC to identify the names of the other aggrieved
women.2 11 When the EEOC identified the individuals, CRST sought to
dismiss 67 women from the suit because the EEOC had not identified
these women during its pre-suit investigation and had not sought to
conciliate the charges with regard to these particular women.212
Emphasizing that Title VII seeks administrative rather than judicial
resolution of disputes, the court found that the EEOC deprived the
employer of a meaningful opportunity to conciliate because it did not
provide the names of all class members and could not estimate the size of
the class prior to filing suit.213 The court drew a distinction between facts
gathered during the EEOC's pre-suit investigation and those gathered
during the discovery phase of a subsequently filed lawsuit.2 14 According
to the court, the EEOC may not use the discovery process "as a fishing
204. See, e.g., Serrano v. Cintas, 699 F.3d 884, 890, 904 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 92 (2013); EEOC v. Bruno's Rest., 13 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1993).
205. EEOC v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, 35 F. Supp. 3d 836, 860 (S.D. Tex.
2014).
206. EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657 (8th Cir. 2012).
207. Id. at 677.
208. Id. at 665.
209. Id. at 667-68.
210. Seeid. at 668.
211. See CRST Van, 679 F.3d at 669 (noting that for nearly two years after the EEOC
filed suit it "did not identify the women comprising the putative class despite the district
court's and CRST's repeated requests to do so").
212. See id. at 673-74.
213. Id. at 676.
214. Id. at675.
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expedition to uncover more violations.215  Finding that "the EEOC
wholly failed to satisfy its statutory pre-suit obligations as to these 67
women," the court upheld the district court's dismissal of the EEOC's
suit.
2 16
In EEOC v. Bloomberg (Bloomberg I), 217 the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York specifically adopted the court's
reasoning in CRST.218 The court concluded that when the EEOC gave
Bloomberg notice that it was pursuing claims on a class-wide basis, this
notice was not sufficient to satisfy its duty to conciliate each individual
claim. 219 The court recognized that dismissal was a harsh remedy and
that some of the meritorious claims would "never see the inside of a
courtroom.,220 Nevertheless, the court found that in failing to conciliate
the individual claims, the EEOC had "completely abdicate[d] its role in
the administrative process.
' 221
At least one court within the Ninth Circuit has come close to
adopting the rule articulated in CRST. In EEOC v. Geo Group,222 the
court dismissed 15 aggrieved individuals from the EEOC's suit on the
grounds that the EEOC did not fulfill its pre-suit conciliation duties.223
The EEOC alleged that male managers sexually harassed numerous
female employees at its prison facilities.224 Although the parties engaged
in extensive negotiations, the court found that the employer did not have
a meaningful opportunity to engage in conciliation with regard to these
15 women because the EEOC did not identify them or provide
information on damages they might have suffered.225 The court stated
that "[i]nformation on who the aggrieved individuals are and the amount
of damages being sought on their behalf is precisely what a reasonable
conciliation effort should provide.,226 This decision has been appealed
to the Ninth Circuit.
227
215. Id. at 676 (citing EEOC v. Dillard's Inc., No. 08-CV-1780-IEG (PCL), 2011 WL
2784516, at *7 (S.D. Cal. July 14, 2011).
216. CRST Van, 679 F.3d at 677.
217. EEOC v. Bloomberg (Bloomberg IV), 967 F. Supp. 2d 802 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
218. Id. at 815.
219. Id. at 814.
220. Id. at 816.
221. Id.
222. Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Geo Grp., Inc., No. CV 10-1995-PHX-SRB, 2012
WL 8667598 (D. Ariz. Apr. 17, 2012), appeal docketed sub nom. EEOC v. Geo Grp.,
Inc., No. 13-16292 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2014).
223. Id. at*15.
224. Id. at *4-5.
225. Id. at *13-14.
226. Id. at *13. The court granted a stay allowing additional time for conciliation
regarding five individuals because the plaintiffs "may have had these individuals in mind
during conciliation proceedings." Id. at *15. The case settled with regard to the claims
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The Ninth Circuit's decision in Geo Group will resolve substantial
disagreement among the lower courts within the circuit. Some courts
have agreed substantially with the CRST approach, maintaining that
when the EEOC does not identify the aggrieved individuals, the
employer faces "a moving target of liability throughout the conciliation
process.,228  This approach favors dismissing claims of unidentified
individuals rather than "improperly reward[ing]" the EEOC with
additional time for conciliation.229 In other district court cases within the
circuit, courts have stated that the Ninth Circuit would not go as far as
the Eighth Circuit did in CRST ° Several courts recognized that he
EEOC is not required to identify every potential class member provided
the EEOC gives the employer reasonable notice of the scope of its
claim.23 1 One court stated specifically that aggrieved individuals may
"piggyback" on charges filed by a claimant as long as the employer has
sufficient notice that the EEOC intends to seek remedies for similarly
situated employees.232
B. Adequate Notice of Class Claims
Several courts have disagreed pointedly with the Eighth Circuit's
CRST decision. In fact, the decision provoked a vigorous dissent. While
the majority chastised the EEOC for its failure to investigate and
conciliate individual claims, the dissent found that a requirement for such
investigations and conciliation put "unprecedented obligations on the
EEOC," and "reward[ed] [the defendant employer] for withholding
information from the Commission.', 233 The dissent emphasized that the
EEOC had put the employer on notice that it was investigating a class of
of some of the women shortly after trial began. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp' t
Opportunity Comm'n, GEO Group to Pay $140,000 To Settle Sexual Harassment Suit
Filed by EEOC and ACRD (Apr. 29, 2013), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/4-29-13.cfm.
227. EEOC v. Geo Grp., Inc., No. 13-16292 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2014).
228. See EEOC v. Swissport Fueling, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1039 (D. Ariz.
2013); see also EEOC v. Am. Samoa Gov't, No. 11-00525 JMS/RLP, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 144324, at *21 (D. Haw. Oct. 5, 2012) (stating that the EEOC "may not use
discovery in the resulting lawsuit as a fishing expedition to uncover more violations").
229. Swissport, 916 F. Supp. 2d at 1040.
230. EEOC v. Evans Fruit Co., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1110 (E.D. Wash. 2012).
231. EEOC v. Dillard's Inc., No. 08-CV-1780-IEG (PCL), 2011 WL 2784516, at *8
(S.D. Cal. July 14, 2011) (holding that there was insufficient notice to the employer of a
nationwide claim but allowing a regional suit to go forward); Evans Fruit, 872 F. Supp.
2d at 1110 (finding that the employer had sufficient notice of claims based on a local
class).
232. Evans Fruit, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 1112.
233. EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 695 (8th Cir. 2012)
(Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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women and had requested the company's help in identifying class
members.234 The EEOC proceeded with suit, according to the dissent,
because it was unable to secure the employer's cooperation during the
conciliation.35 The dissent stated that the Eighth Circuit has required the
EEOC to conciliate for each type of Title VII violation alleged by the
complainant, but not to conciliate regarding each individual in a class
claim. 36
The majority's position, according to the dissent, is inconsistent
with cases in other circuit courts that have held that the "nature and
extent" of the EEOC's investigation is beyond the scope of judicial
review.237 The dissent also concluded that the majority's position is
inconsistent with the purpose of Title VII and that it frustrates the goal of
the 1972 amendments to strengthen the EEOC's enforcement powers.238
The dissent noted that the employer ended the conciliation process and
that the EEOC had made substantial efforts to investigate and conciliate
prior to filing suit.239 According to the dissent, the court should have
stayed the case for further conciliation rather than dismiss it.
240
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Serrano v. Cintas
Corp., 241 indicated that the EEOC has substantial discretion in
242determining the scope of a class-wide claim. Using the deferential
good faith standard it articulated in Keco, the court found that the EEOC
had provided adequate notice to the employer that it was investigating
discrimination on a class-wide basis because it requested relief for
"similarly situated qualified female applicants.243 In doing so, the court
234. Id. at 696.
235. Id.
236. Id. (citing EEOC v. Delight Wholesale Co., 973 F.2d 664, 668-69 (8th Cir.
1992)).
237. Id. (citing EEOC v. Keco Indus., Inc. 748 F.2d 1097, 1100-01 (6th Cir. 1984);
EEOC v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 876 F.2d 16, 17 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting in ADEA cases
that the EEOC need not conciliate on behalf of individual class members); Dinkins v.
Charoen Pokphand USA, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1245-46 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (noting
that "[w]hat matters is that EEOC served [the employer] notice that it was investigating
possible discrimination against a class of women" and that the EEOC need not
"conciliate each individual's Title VII claim separately")).
238. CRST Van, 679 F.3d at 697 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., 446 U.S. 318, 325 (1980)).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Serrano v. Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d 884 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 92
(2013).
242. Id. at 904.
243. Id. (quoting EEOC v. Keco Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097, 1100 (6th Cir. 1984) for
the proposition that "the nature and extent of an EEOC investigation into a discrimination
claim is a matter within the discretion of th[e] agency").
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found that the EEOC did not have to conciliate on behalf of the 13
claimants it ultimately named in its suit."'
Federal district courts that have disagreed with the CRST outcome
have focused on the importance of giving an employer adequate notice of
the alleged unlawful conduct or notice of the type of employees
aggrieved rather than identifying specific aggrieved individuals.2 45 One
court found that "[t]he greater the specificity in describing the alleged
unlawful conduct, the less important it becomes to specifically identify
aggrieved persons.,
246
A federal district court in Texas has had the opportunity to consider
extensively the issue involving unidentified individuals in § 706 claims.
In EEOC v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, the court rejected the majority's
analysis in CRST in favor of the dissent.2 47 The court reasoned that
requiring the EEOC to conciliate each individual claim would unduly tax
the agency's resources.2 48 Avoiding setting out requirements that the
EEOC must always meet, the court found such a "per se rule" arbitrary
and inflexible compared to a case-by-case approach.249 Nonetheless, the
court found that the EEOC should have provided more information to
Bass Pro so that Bass Pro would know "how the class was comprised"
and have a chance to trim the class by eliminating those who had been
hired or whose claims were not timely.250 The court was reluctant to tell
the EEOC how to conduct the conciliation process, but it indicated that
more information should have been forthcoming.51
The Bass Pro court emphasized that a stay was the proper remedy
rather than dismissal of the lawsuit because it did not find that the
244. Id.
245. See, e.g., EEOC v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, 1 F. Supp. 3d 647, 655 (S.D.
Tex. Mar. 4, 2014) (finding it was more important that the employer have notice about
the claims it faced rather than identification of specific individuals); EEOC v. Original
Honeybaked Ham Co. of Ga., 918 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1179-80 (D. Colo. 2013) (rejecting
a "categorical interpretation of CRST' and holding that the employer had sufficient notice
of the potential aggrieved individuals because the EEOC had provided sufficient detail
about the conduct, the alleged perpetrator, and the specific location of the unlawful
conduct); EEOC v. Evans Fruit Co., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1112 (E.D. Wash. 2012)
(finding that the employer must have sufficient notice that the EEOC intends to seek
remedies for similarly situated employees); EEOC v. Dillard's Inc., No. 08-CV-1780-
IEG (PCL), 2011 WL 2784516, at *6, *8 (S.D. Cal. July 14, 2011) (stating that the
EEOC "is not required to identify every potential class member" but must give the
employer reasonable notice of the scope of its claim).
246. Honeybaked Ham, 918 F. Supp. 2d at 1180.
247. Bass Pro, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 665-66.
248. Id. at 665.
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EEOC's premature termination of conciliation was in bad faith.252 The
court distinguished CRST on the basis that, unlike the EEOC's egregious
abdication of duty in CRST, any failure on the EEOC's part in Bass Pro
related only to the conciliation stage, and even there, by the midpoint in
conciliation, the employer was given an outline to roughly estimate the
class size.253
On a motion to reconsider its decision, the court noted the
ambiguity of the language in § 706, which states that the EEOC will use
§ 706 to respond to charges "filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to
be aggrieved, or by a member of the Commission.,254 The court found
that the statute does not make it clear whether the EEOC may pursue
claims on behalf of individuals not identified during the investigation.255
While taking note that the Supreme Court referred to "a group of
aggrieved individuals" in General Telephone, the court found that Bass
Pro involved some individuals who were identified and others who were
not identified. 6 The court was also persuaded that General Telephone
implied that when the EEOC brought suit under § 706, it was to have all
of the same rights as private litigants.257 The court concluded that "if
private litigants can bring a Rule 23 class action to vindicate the rights of
unnamed class members, it follows that the EEOC should be able to do
likewise, uninhibited by § 706's investigation requirement.,
258
In Bass Pro, the court stated that a "growing number of district
courts.., come fairly close to making explicit that individuals on whose
behalf the EEOC intends to bring § 706 suits must have the merits of
252. Bass Pro, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 667.
253. Id. at 668-69.
254. EEOC v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, 35 F. Supp. 3d 836, 861 (S.D. Tex.
2014). This Article does not address the issue of whether the EEOC may, in a lawsuit
initiated by it under § 706, rely on the standard of proof set forth by the Supreme Court in
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772 (1976), and International
Board of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360 (1977). The employer
maintained that the EEOC must use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
in cases brought under § 706. Bass Pro, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 845. The Bass Pro court held
that the EEOC may use the Franks and Teamsters approaches because the Supreme Court
has indicated that plaintiffs may use a flexible approach to proving Title VII violations.
Id. at 847. The court noted that courts of appeal have allowed the EEOC to use the
Teamsters framework in § 706 suits. Id. at 850 (citing Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l, Inc.,
195 F.3d 894, 899 (7th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Am. Nat'l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1188 (4th
Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Monarch Mach. Tool Co., 737 F.2d 1444, 1449 n.3 (6th Cir. 1980)).
255. Bass Pro, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 861.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 862.
258. Id. (internal citation omitted) (citing Franks, 424 U.S. at 748).
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their individual claims investigated.,259 Nevertheless, the court denied
the employer's motion for summary judgment as it was not convinced
that the EEOC was barred from bringing claims on behalf of unidentified
2itM.60victims.
z6
V. IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION: A NEW LANDSCAPE
FOR EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES
Employers and the EEOC 'face a new landscape after the Court's
decision in Mach Mining. In 2012, the Eighth Circuit's CRST decision,
requiring the EEOC to conciliate for each individual in a pattern or
practice suit, was considered a stunning victory for employers.
Attorneys maintained that the decision provided "yet another powerful
broad-side to attack the EEOC's systemic litigation tactics.,261 In 2013,
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Mach Mining was hailed as a
"landmark" victory for the EEOC.2 62 According to the EEOC, the
decision 'carefully applied the letter of the law . . . in a way that
promotes Title VII's goals, protects victims of discrimination, and
preserves the EEOC's critical law-enforcement prerogatives.'' 263  In
choosing between these two extremes, the Supreme Court chose to
follow the direction of its previous decisions, which favor the EEOC's
discretion and authority to pursue suits that serve the public interest.
A. Resolution of the Merits and the EEOC's Discretion To Bring Suit
The Supreme Court addressed issues most similar to the judicial
review of the EEOC's conciliation efforts in EEOC v. Shell Oil.26 The
decision demonstrates that the Court keeps the prevention of systemic
discrimination at the forefront of its analysis and discourages arguments
that result in distractions and delays in resolving the merits of Title VII
claims. In addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of a procedural
259. Id. at 864-65 (citing EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., No. 07-CV-95-LRR,
2009 WL 2524402, at *16 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 13, 2009); EEOC v. Bloomberg L.P.
(Bloomberg IV), 967 F. Supp. 2d 802, 814 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).
260. Bass Pro, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 865.
261. Gerald L. Maatman Jr. & Howard M. Wexler, Time to Pay Up! EEOC Ordered
To Pay $4.694 Million in Fees and Costs for Pursuing "Unreasonable" and
"Groundless" Claims, SEYFARTH SHAW (Aug. 3, 2013),
http://www.workplaceclassaction.com/2013/08/time-to-pay-up-eeoc-ordered-to-pay-4-
694-million-in-fees-and-costs-for-pursuing-unreasonable-and-groundless-claims/.
262. See Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, In Landmark
Ruling, Seventh Circuit Holds Employers Cannot Challenge EEOC Conciliation (Dec.
20, 2013), available at http://wwwl.eeoc.gov//eeoc/newsroom/release/1 2-20-
13b.cfm?renderforprint= 1.
263. See id. (quoting EEOC General Counsel David Lopez).
264. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54 (1984).
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requirement in Shell Oil, the Court stated, "we must keep in view the
more general objectives of Title VII as a whole. The dominant purpose
of the Title, of course, is to root out discrimination in employment.,
265
In Shell Oil, the Supreme Court considered how specific the
information in a charge of discrimination must be before the EEOC can
seek judicial enforcement of an administrative subpoena.2 66  The
employer refused to disclose certain records and data requested by the
EEOC unless the EEOC gave it more information on the basis of the
charges.267 When the EEOC issued a subpoena, the employer, seeking to
quash it, argued that the EEOC had not complied with § 706(b) because
it had not given sufficient facts to the employer.268 Like Shell Oil, cases
alleging failure to conciliate involve arguments related to sufficiency of
process.
In Shell Oil, the Court held that the EEOC's compliance with Title
VII's notice requirement was "a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial
enforcement of a subpoena issued by the EEOC.2 69  But the Court
refused to expand the requirements beyond those specifically stated in
the statute and the EEOC rule.270 The statute requires that charges by the
EEOC be in writing, under oath, and "'in such form as the Commission
requires.' ' ' 2  The EEOC rule requires that "'[e]ach charge should
contain . . . [a] clear and concise statement of the facts, including the
pertinent dates, constituting the alleged unlawful employment
practices.' 27 2  The employer maintained that the subpoena was
unenforceable because the EEOC did not provide sufficient facts in its
charge to satisfy the requirements of Title VIIC 73 The Court concluded
that the charge provided the information required by the statute and the
EEOC's rule and refused to read those requirements to require additional
information.274
The Court was concerned that challenges to the sufficiency of the
charge would lead to delays, including litigation and appeals about a
procedural issue that would have little to do with the merits of the case.
The Court stated,
265. Id. at 77.
266. Id. at 56.
267. Id. at 58.
268. Id. at 59.
269. Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 65.
270. Id. at 79 ("Respondent asks us to read the statute to require the EEOC to
supplement notification . . . with a summary of the statistical data on which the
Commissioner's allegations are founded. We decline the invitation.").
271. Id. at 63 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012)).
272. Id. at 67 (alterations in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12 (1983)).
273. Id. at 59.
274. Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 81-82.
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The imposition on the EEOC of a duty to reveal the information that
precipitated the charge would enable a recalcitrant employer, in a
subpoena enforcement action, to challenge the adequacy of the
Commission's disclosures and to appeal an adverse ruling by the
district court on that issue. The net effect would be to hamper
significantly the Commission's ability to investigate expeditiously
claims of systemic discrimination.275
The Court recognized that employers could use the argument that
the charge was insufficient as "a potent weapon" to delay EEOC
investigations.276 The Court stated that "[a]ny marginal advantage, in
terms of facilitating voluntary compliance.., would be more than offset
by the concomitant impairment of the ability of the EEOC to identify and
eliminate systemic employment discrimination.277
The Seventh Circuit's Mach Mining decision is based on reasoning
similar to that of the Supreme Court in Shell Oil, which the Court could
have used as a blueprint to affirm the Seventh Circuit's decision. The
Court could have rejected judicial review of conciliation efforts to
prevent employers from employing the "potent weapon" argument hat
conciliation was inadequate. The EEOC has conceded that its duty to
conciliate is a judicial prerequisite to filing suit. It fulfills that duty by
providing documentation to a court that it initiated conciliation and that,
at some point, it determined conciliation failed. The language of the
statute requires no more than such facial compliance.278 In Mach
Mining, the Seventh Circuit expressed concern that time and resources
that should have been devoted to resolving the merits of the claims were
squandered on litigation and appeals about the sufficiency of conciliation
efforts.279 This concern echoes that of the Supreme Court in Shell Oil
regarding "recalcitrant employers" challenging the sufficiency of the
EEOC's procedural steps.280
As in the Shell Oil decision, the Seventh Circuit in Mach Mining
emphasized that eradicating systemic discrimination must be the central
focus of Title VII suits. Moreover, the court asserted that there was "no
challenge ... to the facial sufficiency of [the conciliation] documents.2 81
275. Id. at 72.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 81.
278. See EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 173 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Shell
Oil, 466 U.S. at 81 (1984)) (noting that there was "no challenge here to the facial
sufficiency of these documents" regarding failure to conciliate prior to filing of
complaint), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 2872 (June 30, 2014) (No. 13-1019).
279. See id. ("The defense has also slowed discovery on the merits of the underlying
discriminatory hiring claim.").
280. See Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 72.
281. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 173 (citing Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 81).
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The proposed defense, according to the Seventh Circuit, allows
employers to "avoid liability for unlawful discrimination . . . through
protracted and ultimately pointless litigation over whether the EEOC
tried hard enough to settle.,282 In fact, the Seventh Circuit maintained
that judicial review of conciliation efforts undermines voluntary
compliance and the goals of Title VII. 283 Not only does the informal
process envisioned by Congress give way to "endless disputes over
whether the EEOC did enough before going to court,' 284 but the goal of
eradicating discriminatory practices is overlooked. As the Seventh
Circuit observes, employers, especially those who face potentially large
and costly claims of discrimination, risk little and gain much in seeking
dismissal based on a failure to conciliate.285
In Shell Oil, the Court refused to impose burdens on the EEOC that
were not reflected in the language of the statute and the EEOC
286regulation. Mach Mining suggests that the EEOC should exercise its
authority to "issue regulations that provide more detailed content to the
conciliation obligation, even while protecting the Commission's
discretion to decide what constitutes an acceptable agreement.,
287
While the EEOC should be guided by its internal policies on
conducting quality investigations and conciliation,288 promulgating
regulations that would be binding would open it to unnecessary attack.
The statute's explicit reference to the "informality" of the conciliation
process affords considerable flexibility to the EEOC in how the process
proceeds. The informality of the conciliation process would be
compromised and the EEOC would sacrifice its ability to respond
flexibly to the interests of various cases if it committed to binding
regulations defining conciliation procedures.
Even in cases where the EEOC might have advanced negotiations
by giving more information to the employer, dismissing claims does
nothing to advance the goals of Title VII. The Bloomberg case illustrates
this point. The court dismissed claims based on a failure to conciliate
defense while acknowledging that some of the claims might be
"meritorious" but "now will never see the inside of a courtroom. ' 289
Nevertheless, the court found dismissal appropriate because it could not
282. Id. at 172.
283. Id. at 178-80.
284. Id. at 179.
285. Id.
286. See Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 65-66.
287. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 35.
288. See Quality Control Plan 2013 Draft Principles, supra note 51; supra notes 51-
52 and accompanying text.




"promote[] litigation in contravention of Title VII's emphasis on
voluntary proceedings and informal conciliation.,290  The court's
conclusions in Bloomberg are shortsighted as they elevate adherence to
unspecified procedures over the goal of addressing unlawful
discrimination. Furthermore, the court's fear of promoting litigation
ignores the fact that Title VII authorizes the EEOC to bring civil
actions-precisely because Congress realized that voluntary compliance
was frequently unsuccessful. Thus, courts that follow Bloomberg that
would dismiss claims because of a failure to conciliate ignore not only
the discretion invested in the EEOC in the conciliation process, but also
its authority to bring suit and, most importantly, the overarching goals of
Title VII.
The Supreme Court has also emphasized the EEOC's discretion to
litigate suits that it believes are in the public's interest, even though the
preferred method of resolving Title VII suits is through voluntary
conciliation. In EEOC v. Waffle House,zg l the Court recognized that
"once a charge is filed.., the EEOC is in command of the process" and
"master of its own case.,292 Moreover, the Court recognized that Title
VII "confers on the agency the authority to evaluate the strength of the
public interest at stake.293  The Court noted that "it is the public
agency's province-not that of the court-to determine whether public
resources should be committed to the recovery of victim-specific relief.
And if the agency makes that determination, the statutory text
unambiguously authorizes it to proceed in a judicial forum.
294
In addressing the conciliation issue, courts have not given adequate
consideration to the EEOC's right to pursue cases in the public interest.
For example, in Asplundh Tree, the court concluded that the EEOC's
decision to file suit "may have been motivated, at least in part, by the fact
that conciliation, unlike litigation, is not in the public domain.,
295
Whether the EEOC chooses to file suit in high-profile cases or not, the
Court's decision in Waffle House suggests that such decisions are clearly
within the agency's discretion.296
290. Id.
291. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 291 (2002). The Court considered
whether an agreement between an employer and an employee to arbitrate employment-
related disputes bars the EEOC from pursuing victim-specific judicial relief. Id. at 284-
85. The Court held that it did not. Id. at 285. Three justices dissented. Id. at 298
(Thomas, J., Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 291 (majority opinion).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 291-92.
295. EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1261 n.3 (11 th Cir. 2003).
296. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Retail Litigation Center, Inc., Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America, and National Federation of Independent
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The EEOC's discretion to pursue cases that advance the public
interest also weighs against the argument that it must attempt conciliation
for each aggrieved individual before filing suit. Preserving the EEOC's
ability to pursue cases involving systemic discrimination comes at an
important time. Several scholars have noted that the EEOC has a greater
role to play in preventing systemic discrimination since the Supreme
Court's decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes.2 97 In Wal-Mart, the Court found
that claims for backpay in a Title VII gender discrimination class action
suit could not be certified if the victims "would be entitled to an
individualized award of monetary damages.298  Thus, assuming, as
many scholars have, that the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart has
made class action cases under Title VII much more difficult to pursue,299
the EEOC's role in addressing systemic discrimination is more important
than ever.300 Without the requirements of Rule 23, the EEOC has the
ability to address discrimination using a "class-action-like
mechanism.,30 1 Allowing the EEOC to bring claims under § 706 on
behalf of unidentified individuals improves the chances of deterring
systemic discrimination.
B. The High Costs of Judicial Review and Minimal Benefits to
Employers
Much of the battle regarding review of conciliation efforts centers
on the litigation strategy of employers and the EEOC. The statutory
scheme favors erring on the side of resolving meritorious claims,
especially when there are sufficient checks on overzealous EEOC
conduct. With its emphasis on the "net effect" of conciliation and
litigation under Title VII, the various strategies that the EEOC and
employers pursue in the process should not concern the Court.302
Business Small Business Legal Center in Support of Petitioners at 6, EEOC v. Mach
Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171 (7th Cir. 2013) 134 S. Ct. 2872, cert. granted, (June 30,
2014) (No. 13-1019) (stating that the EEOC may choose not o settle privately because of
the "allure of filing a high-profile case").
297. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); see Melissa Hart, Civil
Right and Systemic Wrongs, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 455, 475 (2011) (suggesting
a greater reliance on EEOC enforcement for cases involving systemic discrimination post
Wal-Mart); Joseph A. Seiner, Weathering Wal-Mart, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1343,
1345, 1352-56 (2014).
298. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557.
299. See Seiner, supra note 297, at 1350 & n.61 (collecting articles in which scholars
"denounced the case as one that undermines the rights of workplace discrimination
victims").
300. See id. at 1345, 1352-56; Hart, supra note 297, at 475-76.
301. See Seiner, supra note 297, at 1345, 1356.
302. See EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 72 (1984).
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If the Supreme Court finds that judicial review of conciliation
efforts is required, the Seventh Circuit's fear that "the employer's
incentive to reach an agreement can be outweighed by the incentive to
stockpile exhibits for the coming court battle"30 3 could be realized. Mach
Mining and employer groups assert that employers have strong
incentives to settle and that no rational employer "would incur with
certainty the financial and reputational costs of an EEOC lawsuit in the
hopes of subsequently manipulating the conciliation review process.30 4
Nevertheless, it appears that the Seventh Circuit's concern about
employers using a failure to conciliate defense has merit. The EEOC
maintains in its brief to the Court that "in the circuits that permit judicial
review, the effort to 'stockpile exhibits' is already happening.30 5 One
prominent employment firm, referencing the result in CRST, advises
employers to view every communication with the EEOC as an exhibit in
future court motions.30 6
Employers' fears that a lack of judicial review will lead the EEOC
to "abandon conciliation altogether or misuse it by advancing unrealistic
and even extortionate settlement demands" are unfounded.30 7 Despite a
few cases that indicated insufficient investigation and a rush to litigate,
the risk of the EEOC abusing its right to bring suit is minimal. In
addition to the natural constraints provided by limited resources, Title
VII provides that courts have discretion to award attorneys' fees to a
prevailing defendant.30 8 Interpreting this provision, the Supreme Court
stated that fees may be awarded "upon a finding that the plaintiffs action
was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not
brought in subjective bad faith."309 This provision is sufficient to protect
employers in the rare case that the EEOC brings an unfounded suit. In
CRST, for example, the court awarded the employer $4.6 million in
attorneys' fees and expenses because the EEOC brought a sexual
harassment suit involving approximately 270 allegedly aggrieved
303. See EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 178 (7th Cir. 2013), cert.
granted, 134 S. Ct. 2872 (June 30, 2014) (No. 13-1019).
304. E.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Retail Litigation Center, Inc., supra note 296, at 4.
305. See Brief for the Respondent, supra note 3, at 40.
306. Pro-Actively Addressing and Preparing for EEOC Investigations & Lawsuits,
SEYFARTH SHAW 7 (2012),
http://www.seyfarth.com/dir-docs/publications/eeoccountdownwebinar72512.pdf.
307. See Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 179.
308. Section 706(k) of Title VII provides: "In any action or proceeding under this
subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable
attorney's fee .... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2012).
309. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
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individuals with little investigation. 30 All claims were dismissed by the
district court or withdrawn by the EEOC, with the exception of one claim
that settled for $50,000. 3" In finding that the EEOC's claim was
frivolous, the court noted that the EEOC presented no expert evidence,
statistics, or legal authority and its case depended on nothing more than
"bald assertions.'"
312
If the EEOC pursues a Title VII case that a court determines is
"frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation," it will pay the
consequences, and employers will at least be reimbursed for the expenses
incurred.313 Most cases, however, that have alleged a failure to conciliate
defense would not be found frivolous or unreasonable. In cases where
the employer claims the EEOC imposed too short a period of time for
conciliation, arbitrarily terminated conciliation, or provided insufficient
information, courts should either accept the EEOC's conclusion that it
satisfied its pre-suit duty to conciliate or exercise its discretion to order
further conciliation.
CONCLUSION
Courts currently take divergent views of the EEOC's pre-suit
obligations. At one extreme, courts would allow a searching inquiry into
the conciliation process, with an emphasis on whether or not the EEOC
responded reasonably to the employer's reasonable demands. At the
other extreme, one court has stated that courts should require only facial
compliance with the conciliation requirement. The Supreme Court chose
not to affirm the Seventh Circuit's decision in Mach Mining. However,
in stating that courts should not review conciliation efforts, the Seventh
Circuit relied primarily on the text of the statute and the thrust of the
statutory scheme, both themes that the U.S. Supreme Court echoed in its
recent decision in Mach Mining. The Seventh Circuit's approach is
supported by Supreme Court decisions suggesting that courts should not
undercut the wide discretion that Title VII gives to the EEOC in
determining when conciliation will be fruitful and when the public
interest is served by filing suit. A decision requiring judicial review
could compromise the informality of the process and require the EEOC
to guard against employers' strategic use of a failure to conciliate
defense. However, the narrow review outlined by the Supreme Court in
Mach Mining limited this danger, and the Court's dictated remedy of
310. EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., No. 07-CV-95-LRR, 2013 WL 3984478, at
*2, *20 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 1, 2013).
311. Id. at *6, *21.
312. Id. at 13-14.
313. See Christiansburg, 434 U.S at 421.
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more conciliation rather than dismissal of the claim safeguards against
loss of meritorious claims due to procedural bungles.
ADDENDUM
As this Article went to press, the Supreme Court held, in a
unanimous decision, that EEOC efforts to conciliate are subject to
judicial review but that the scope of that review is very narrow.3 14 The
EEOC, according to the Court, has "extensive discretion to determine the
kind and amount of communication with an employer appropriate in any
given case.31 5  Although the Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's
argument in Mach Mining that there is no workable standard of judicial
review regarding conciliation efforts, the Court largely endorsed the
reasoning of the Seventh Circuit and concluded that a "relatively
barebones review" is appropriate.31 6 The Court noted that the Seventh
Circuit did in fact subject the EEOC's activities to "a smidgen of review"
that entailed the Commission's pleading that it had complied with pre-
litigation requirements, including its two letters to the employer.31 7 The
Court's analysis is consistent with the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in its
emphasis on the EEOC's discretion, the importance of preserving
confidentiality, and the conclusion that the proper remedy for any flaw in
the conciliation process is more conciliation, rather than dismissal of the
case.318 For these reasons, the Supreme Court's decision is decidedly a
victory for the EEOC and employees seeking to hold employers
accountable for workplace discrimination.31 9
A. Manageable Judicial Review of Conciliation Efforts
The Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that Title VII
does not require judicial review of conciliation efforts because of "'the
314. Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1649 (2015).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 1649, 1655-56
317. Id. at 1650-51 (citing 738 F. 3d 171 at 184).
318. Id. at 1654-56.
319. See Kevin McGowan, EEOC Conciliation Subject to Court Scrutiny, But Scope
of Review is Limited, Justices Rule, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 82, at AA-1 (Apr. 29,
2015) (noting EEOC General Counsel P. David Lopez "called the ruling 'great news' for
the agency and iscrimination victims [in that] the court rejected the intrusive review
proposed by [Mach Mining]"); Jacob Gershman, Legal Experts Weigh in on Supreme
Court's EEOC Ruling, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 29, 2015),
http:/Iblogs.wsj.com/law/2015/04/29/legal-experts-weigh-in-on-supreme-courts-eeoc-
ruling/ (noting employers had "little to cheer" in Supreme Court's Mach Mining decision
and quoting law professor that "it's unambiguously a win for the EEOC").
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strong presumption' favoring judicial review of administrative action.32
Nothing in Title VII rebuts this presumption, the Court stated.3
Moreover, the Court found that the language of Title VII makes
conciliation mandatory.322 The Court compared the EEOC's pre-
litigation requirements to the similar requirements placed upon
discriminatees, namely that they must file a charge at the EEOC and
receive a right to sue letter before proceeding to court.32 3 The Court
stated that it did not "doubt the EEOC's trustworthiness, or its fidelity to
law," but that Congress recognizes that "legal lapses and violations
occur, and especially so when they have no consequence.324
Contrary to the Seventh Circuit's conclusion in Mach Mining, the
Court found that there was a "manageable standard" for reviewing
conciliation efforts.325 The Court provided information about what is
required of the EEOC to fulfill its statutory duty "by informal methods of
conference, conciliation, and persuasion.326  Using dictionary
definitions, the Court stated that the terms utilized in the statute indicate
"'consultation or discussion,' an attempt to 'reconcile' different
positions, and a 'means of argument, reasoning, or entreaty."'327 In
short, the EEOC must inform the employer about the alleged unlawful
employment claim and provide the employer an opportunity to discuss
and resolve the matter through voluntary compliance.32s
B. Scope of Judicial Review -"Relatively Barebones"
In addressing the scope of judicial review of the EEOC's
conciliation efforts, the Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's conclusion
that courts may limit consideration of conciliation efforts to a facial
examination of EEOC documents.329  Nevertheless, the standard of
review the Court fashioned is more similar to the Seventh Circuit's
prescription for minimal review and far from the "more intrusive review"
that employers have endorsed and some courts have favored.330 The
Court concluded that the EEOC's "bookend" documents consisting of an
320. Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2015) (citing Bowen v.
Michigan Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986)).
321. Id. at 1653.
322. Id. at 1651.
323. Id. at 1651-52.
324. Id. at 1652-53.
325. Mach Mining, 135 S. Ct. at 1652.
326. Id. at 1652.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 1652-53.
329. Id. at 1653-54.
330. Mach Mining, 135 S. Ct. at 1653.
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initial letter indicating the EEOC found reasonable cause and would
contact the employer about the conciliation process and a final letter
stating that conciliation efforts had occurred and failed, were not
sufficient to prove that conciliation had occurred.33' Judicial review, the
Court stated, must "verify" the EEOC's assertion that it tried to conciliate
the discrimination claim.332 The Court concluded, however that "[a]
sworn affidavit from the EEOC stating that... its efforts have failed will
usually suffice to show that it has met the conciliation requirement.
' 333
The EEOC's verification could be challenged by an employer's affidavit
stating the EEOC did not provide information about the charge or
attempt to discuss voluntary resolution.334 A court's review, the Court
stated, would be limited to fact-finding about these issues."'
The Court specifically rejected the "deep dive" approach to
reviewing conciliation efforts that the employer recommended in Mach
Mining.336 The employer had suggested a "bargaining checklist" that
imposed requirements on the EEOC such as disclosing the minimal
remedial amount it would accept; refraining from take-it-or-leave offers;
and engaging in a process of offer and counteroffer with time to review
and respond to each during negotiations.337 The Supreme Court refused
to impose requirements that are not specified in Title VII. 338 Like the
Seventh Circuit, the Court emphasized the broad discretion given to the
EEOC in its conciliation efforts.339 The Court made it clear that courts
should not review the EEOC's "strategic decisions," "the pace and
duration of conciliation efforts," or "the content of its demands for
relief.
340
The Supreme Court, like the Seventh Circuit, also recognized the
importance of Title VII's confidentiality requirement.341 Judicial review
of the content of negotiations is prohibited, the Court stated.342 The
Court noted that confidentiality promotes candor in discussions, thereby
increasing the likelihood of an agreement.343
331. Id.
332. Id. (emphasis in original).
333. Id. at 1656.
334. Id.
335. Mach Mining, 135 S. Ct. at 1656.
336. Id. at 1653-54.
337. Id. at 1653-55.
338. Id. at 1655-56.
339. Id. at 1656.
340. Mach Mining, 135 S. Ct. at 1654.
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The Court's analysis is also similar to that of the Seventh Circuit in
Mach Mining because it emphasizes the importance of resolving the
merits of the claim over the conciliation process.344 The Court
specifically rejected any similarity between the NLRA's good faith
requirements and the conciliation requirements under Title VII.1
41
Where the NLRA has specific rules about the bargaining process, "Title
VII ultimately cares about substantive results, while eschewing any
reciprocal duties of good-faith negotiation.
3 46
The Court concluded that if a court were to find that the EEOC did
not fulfill its statutory duty to conciliate, "the appropriate remedy is to
order the EEOC to undertake the mandated efforts to obtain voluntary
compliance.',347  In other words, the appropriate remedy is to renew
conciliation efforts. The Court's decision makes no reference to
dismissing cases for failure to conciliate.
C. Conciliation Issues Resolved and Unresolved
The Supreme Court's decision resolves some but not all of the
issues raised in the lower courts regarding conciliation. The Court stated
that conciliation efforts are subject to judicial review and provided some
guidance about the scope of judicial review. Although the Court did not
specifically adopt or endorse any of the standards followed by the circuit
courts of appeal, or use terminology such as "deferential" or "more
stringent" in describing its approach to reviewing failure to conciliate
claims, its approach is closest to the so-called deferential standard of
review.348 Consistent with the Supreme Court's decision, lower courts
that have used the deferential standard have focused primarily on
whether or not the EEOC attempted to communicate with the employer
and have steered clear of inquiring into the content of conciliation
efforts.349 In light of the Supreme Court's decision, however, courts
should refrain from using the term "good faith" in connection with the
review of conciliation efforts. The Court made it clear not only that Title
VII's conciliation process is entirely distinct from the "good faith"
344. Id. at 1655-56.
345. Mach Mining, 135 S. Ct. 1654.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 1656.
348. See discussion supra Part III.A
349. See, e.g., EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1979)
(conciliation requirement satisfied when employer failed to respond to invitation to
conciliate); EEOC v. Keco Indust., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097, 1102 (6th Cir. 1984)
(conciliation requirement satisfied when employer rejected conciliation attempt); Serrano




bargaining required in NLRA proceedings, but also that "Title VII...
eschew[s] any reciprocal duties of good-faith negotiation.
' 350
The Supreme Court's decision clearly rejects the more stringent
standard of review used by several circuit courts of appeal.35' This
standard employed a three-part inquiry requiring the EEOC to (1) outline
to the employer its cause for believing an unlawful discrimination
practice had occurred; (2) give the employer a dhance to comply
voluntarily; and (3) respond in a reasonable and flexible manner to
reasonable questions or offers of the employer.352 The Supreme Court's
decision requires the EEOC to comply with the first and second parts of
this standard, but rejects the third, most controversial step. The Seventh
Circuit had cautioned that courts should not seek to distinguish between
the process and substance of the conciliation because it interfered with
the EEOC's discretion as well as the confidentiality that Title VII
mandates.353 The Supreme Court's decision clarified that courts must
respect the broad discretion that Title VII gives to the EEOC regarding
conciliation as well as the importance of maintaining confidentiality in
the conciliation process.
354
The Court also made it clear that, if the EEOC fails to fulfill its
conciliation obligations, the proper remedy is an order for more
conciliation.355 With this statement, the Court indicates that dismissing
suits for failure to conciliate is not the appropriate remedy. Some lower
courts have maintained that claims should be dismissed when the EEOC
has not given the employer an opportunity to conciliate.356 These cases
have often involved situations in which the EEOC has sued on behalf of
a class of unidentified aggrieved individuals. In deciding Mach Mining,
the Supreme Court did not have the opportunity to address how courts
should review conciliation issues involving unidentified aggrieved
individuals. The Court's language, however, suggests that it would
reject the approach followed by some lower courts that have required the
EEOC to conciliate with regard to each aggrieved individual in order to
350. Mach Mining, 135 S. Ct. at 1654.
351. See discussion supra Part III.B.
352. This standard was developed by the court in Marshall v. Sun Oil Co. (Del.), 605
F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1979) in a case involving the ADEA and was adopted in Title VII
cases in the Fifth, Eleventh, and Second Circuits. See discussion supra Part III.B.
353. EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 183 (7th Cir. 2013).
354. Mach Mining, 135 S. Ct. at 1654-55.
355. Id. at 1656 ("Should the court find in favor of the employer, the appropriate
remedy is to order the EEOC to undertake the mandated efforts to obtain voluntary
compliance.").
356. See, e.g., EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657 (8th Cir. 2012);
EEOC v. Bloomberg (Bloomberg IV), 967 F. Supp. 2d 802 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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satisfy its pre-suit obligations.357  To fulfill its conciliation duties, the
Court stated, the EEOC must provide notice to the employer describing
"what the employer has done and which employees (or what class of
employees) has suffered as a result."358 The Court's reference to a "class
of employees" suggests that the EEOC fulfills its conciliation
requirement by notifying the employer of the alleged unlawful conduct
and the type of employees aggrieved and opening communication on this
basis. Some lower courts have followed this approach, recognizing the
EEOC's broad discretion in determining the scope of a class-wide
claim.359
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision, employers and
employees are posturing to spin the Court's decision in their favor. With
some issues resolved about the EEOC's conciliation efforts and the scope
of review required, the next frontier is likely to be whether the EEOC has
fulfilled its pre-suit obligation to investigate.360 Title VII requires the
EEOC to notify an employer of the charge of an unlawful employment
practice and to "make an investigation thereof.,
361
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Mach Mining in a case involving the sufficiency of
an EEOC investigation. In EEOC v. Sterling Jewelers Inc.,362 the EEOC
alleged that Sterling, the nation's largest jewelry store chain,
discriminated against women by not paying them the same as their male
counterparts and by not promoting qualified women.363 Sterling moved
for summary judgment, maintaining that the EEOC did not conduct a
sufficient pre-suit investigation and, therefore, failed to satisfy its
statutory duty under Title VII. 364 The Second Circuit disagreed. The
court held that under Title VII, "courts may review whether the EEOC
conducted an investigation, but not the sufficiency of an
investigation.,365 The court noted that the Supreme Court's decision in
Mach Mining did not address the scope of EEOC investigations, but
357. See discussion supra at Part IV.A.
358. Mach Mining, 135 S. Ct. at 1651 (emphasis added).
359. See discussion supra at Part IV.B, regarding Serrano v. Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d
884, 904 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 92 (2013) and EEOC v. Bass Pro
Outdoor World, LLC, 1 F. Supp. 3d 647, 665-66 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2014).
360. See Ben James, EEOC, Sterling Jewelers Spar Over Mach Mining at 2nd Circ.,
LAW 360 (May 4, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/651281/eeoc-sterling-jewelers-
spar-over-mach-mining-at-2nd-circ.
361. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3, 2000e-5(a) (2012).
362. EEOC v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., No.14-1782, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 15986 (2d
Cir. Sept. 9, 2015).
363. Id. at *4.
364. Id. at *7.
365. Id. at *3.
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found that judicial review of an EEOC investigation is similar to judicial
review of the conciliation process.366  In other words, the court
emphasized the limited nature of judicial review of an EEOC
investigation. The court relied on the Supreme Court's language that
"Title VII ultimately cares about substantive results."
367
In Mach Mining, as in previous decisions, the Supreme Court has
consistently emphasized that eradicating systemic discrimination must be
the focus of Title VII suits. Consequently, in reviewing the EEOC's
statutory duties under Title VII, lower courts should not impose
additional requirements on the EEOC that would detract from the
underlying issues of discrimination or lead to dismissal of meritorious
claims.
366. Id. at *9-10.
367. Id. at *11 (citing Mach Mining, 135 S. Ct. at 1654).
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